Account of the French/Chickasaw War 1739-40
Bienville's Revenge
Bienville 0: Chickasaw 2. That was the score in Louisiana. The British colonies and Europeans scored the Chickasaw Wars of 1736: French 0: Chickasaw 2. Bienville felt the eyes of France peering down. The French had been humiliated in two 1736 campaigns against the Chickasaw. Both had been planned by Bienville. The campaigns were to have been fought simultaneously. Bienville was to have met Pierre D'Artaguiette's Northern Force at the Chickasaw villages in March 1736. He was late. Unfortunately, D'Artaguiette's force was on-time, and it was devastated by the Chickasaw with almost all of its officers killed including D'Artaguiette.
Then, in May Bienville had his turn. At least he left the Chickasaw with his life; many in his force did not. What were Bienville's excuses? They were practiced…The flatboat builders were late; he lacked artillery; the Chickasaws would not come out of their forts to fight; the latest French troops were inexperienced; and the Choctaw were not manageable when needed. Could Bienville make amends?
Campaign Preparations
Governor Bienville had another chance. He didn't waste time. In June 1736 he and Edme Gatien de Salmon (Salmon), the Commissary General of Louisiana, wrote Count de Maurepas (Maurepas), the Minister of Marine, in France. He needed 150 good recruits (troops) to fill the ranks of the Chickasaw war dead, and he requested 400 good troops to mount another campaign against the Chickasaw, see MPA I 315. The reply addressed Bienville's requests. Under the King of France signature via Maurepas, Bienville was to be given not only the 550 French troops that he had asked for, but also 150 more. But the extra troops would come at a price. In a letter from the King of France about November 1738, "His majesty is convinced that he could have dispensed with sending such a considerable reinforcement, but he has been very glad to assure more and more the success of the expedition, and he does not doubt at all that Sieur de Bienville will succeed in accomplishing the destruction of the Chickasaw Indians." See MPA I 377. Was Bienville's instruction plain enough?
Bienville must have deduced that the additional French troops promised by the King would be just as inexperienced as his last arriving French troops. On June 28, 1736 Bienville wrote Maurepas about his opinion of the troops sent to replace those lost to the Chickasaw, "The recruits (troops) that came on the Gironde (a French ship) are even worse than the preceding ones. There are only one or two men more than five feet in height. The rest are below four feet ten inches. As for their sentiments, I can add that of their number of fifty-two more than half have already been flogged through the lines for theft." See MPA I 310. What about their steel and resolve? Had any been on a European battlefield? None from France would have fought any foe like the Chickasaw who certainly would not fight in formal battle lines. They would be too soft physically to handle a two month oversea voyage from France followed by a two to three month flatboat trip up the Mississippi River beset with heat, humidity, and heavy rowing to reach the Chickasaw. The Louisiana troops could take the heat and humidity but proved they could not fight the Chickasaw. Bienville needed experienced Indian fighters. He wrote Maurepas to coordinate sending Canadian troops for the army. Again, he got more than he bargained for . . . two Canadian forces were selected to join the Chickasaw campaign. One was to be lead by Captain Pierre Joseph de Celoron de Blainville (Celoron) - Biography Link. The other was to be lead by Charles le Moyne de Longueuil (Longueuil) - Biography Link, a nephew of Bienville. Here a link to his journey from Canada to join Bienville's army assembled to destroy the Chickasaw. As you read, Longueuil's army numbered 442 men including soldiers, habitants, Indian peoples and cadets. The Canadians forces would travel separate routes until joining at Fort Chartres (40 miles south of modern St. Louis) before continuing to the depot (Fort Assumption at modern Memphis).
Bienville also planned to use Louisiana troops in the campaign. Most would hail from New Orleans and Fort Chartres in the Illinois country. They were needed to build a depot (Fort St. Francis) near the Mississippi River, but not located on Chickasaw land. All of the Louisiana troops were to be under the command of Bienville's nephew, the Chevalier de Noyan. (Biography of Chevalier de Noyan (de Noyan) is in the Musing: Were the French Distracted? See first list in Musing Item 25). De Noyan who left New Orleans in April 1739 was also commissioned by Bienville to build a fort on Chickasaw territory and explore the interior of the country to find a favorable road (path) to the Chickasaw villages. Hundreds of Louisiana Negro slaves were expected to do the heavy work: rowing the flatboats, cutting trees, and even pushing handcarts from Fort Assumption to the Chickasaw. Who owned the Negro slaves is an intriguing story within the campaign, as we shall discover later.
While Bienville contemplated the advantages and disadvantages of the extra troops, he also had to consider the gifts of artillery from the King. The King was sending four eight-pounder cannon, eight four-pounder cannon, two nine-pounder (nine inches of bore) mortars of brass, two of iron of six-pounder (six inch bore) caliber, twelve other small mortars of wrought iron, two thousand grenades, powder, bullets, balls (for cannon) and bombs (for mortars), see MPA I 384. The King really meant for the Chickasaw to be destroyed. But was it too much artillery? Wouldn't a couple of small mortars be sufficient? After all, the Chickasaw forts, the targets for the artillery, were small. In September 1736 Bienville in a letter to Maurepas had asked for two small mortars which two men or one horse could carry and throw bombs weighing 20 pounds ( a six-inch mortar), see MPA I 322. The bombs for the nine-inch mortar would weigh 60 pounds each. How would Bienville transport the larger mortars, their bombs, all the heavy cannon, and their balls from the depot (Fort Assumption) all the way to the Chickasaw? Many oxen and carts would be required and Negroes for the handcarts. Didn't Maurepas remember that the four-pounder cannons had proved ineffective in 1730 against the Natchez who had two similarly constructed forts as the Chickasaw's? See MPA I 79. And the Natchez forts were less than a mile from the Mississippi River, while the Chickasaw villages would be 120 miles, at least. Nonetheless, Bienville couldn't turn down the King.
Gifts from the King to Bienville of more troops and artillery had to come at a price. They did. The King wrote to Bienville that he had another commander selected for the campaign, Sieur de Noailles D'Aime (Noailles), "who has the talents and the experience necessary for the command." See MPA I 377. Bienville was to be Noailles' second (in command), but he would still plan the campaign. After forty years of service as a four-time Commander, Noailles was Bienville's payback. At Versailles they must have thought Bienville incapable. No talent or experience. The King's comments about Noailles had to burn his soul.
More French troops, supplies, and materiel including artillery required transportation from New Orleans whichever route was to be taken. Bienville would need flatboats, lots of them. He learned from his 1736 Chickasaw campaign mistake and started the flatboat contractors early. By May 1737 fifty flatboats or bateau had been ordered to be constructed for transporting the French troops and supplies and to serve as general conveyance. The flatboats were to be built of live oak and cypress. Each was ordered to be forty feet long, nine feet wide, and four feet deep capable of transporting twelve tons, see MPA I 348. In addition, the flatboats were to be caulked, tarred, and equipped for rowing.
Route Explorations
Before either a depot or fort could be built, a route must be selected. Originally Bienville presented three alternative routes to Maurepas. First was the Tombigbee River route. The army would row flatboats from Fort Maurepas at Mobile to Fort Tombecbe (Tombekbe) which would serve as depot for supplies and materiels. Then it would row flatboats to near the Chickasaw villages (Cotton Gin Port near Amory, MS). This was the route taken by Bienville in 1736 (see Musing: Bienville's Southern Force). The second route was by the Mississippi River from New Orleans by flatboats up the Yazoo River to head of navigation then overland to the Chickasaw villages. Third was also by the Mississippi River by flatboats from New Orleans to 30 miles or so south of the 4th Chickasaw Bluff (Memphis) then overland to the Yazoo River near the abandoned Chachouma village thence overland to the Chickasaw villages. See MPA I 332. In his correspondences Bienville admitted the Arkansas Indian peoples had convinced him that the third route was the shortest. The Tombigbee River route had two issues: one, the river was narrow meaning flatboats could be subjected to Chickasaw attack at any point above Fort Tombecbe, and two, the Choctaws and Chickasaw shared a rare peace. As Fort Tombecbe was near the eastern Choctaw villages, the Choctaw could easily alert the Chickasaw of French activities on the Tombigbee River.
Selected Route to the Chickasaw
Bienville convinced Maurepas that the Mississippi River to Yazoo River routes were superior to the Tombigbee. Note on the 1733 Concha map, the Yazoo River is labeled "R. des yazou". Beginning 1737 Bienville had his engineers (Broutin and Verges) and draftsman (Saucier) spend a considerable time surveying the upper Yazoo River routes. Unfortunately, one of his engineers, Verges, made a mistake calculating the distance from the old, deserted Chachouma villages labeled on the Concha map "PAYS DES CHACHOUMA" to the Chickasaw "PAYS DES CHICACHAS" by a factor of one-half. The result was Bienville believed the route from Mississippi River to Chachouma to Chickasaw was many miles closer than by the 4th Chickasaw bluffs to the Chickasaw. After surveying the Tombigbee River, Broutin discovered Verges mistake, the route selection was moved to the bluffs. (Note: The result of surveying the three routes produced a remarkably detailed map by Broutin, Verges, and Saucier. See Musing: The Broutin Map 1743.)
Best Season for the Campaign
Bienville's early planning established the best season of campaign which would match the arrival of French, Louisianan, and Canadian troops. In December 1737 he was convinced the fall was the best season for the campaign for a number of reasons. He wrote Maurepas, ". . . the campaign will be made in September and October which are two months of good weather. The flour from the Illinois, the abundance of buffaloes for hunting on the banks of the river and the grain of the Chickasaw which will then be in the fields, will be of great assistance to us, and morally speaking we shall find all the facilities that can be found in a country as difficult as this one is." See MPA I 359.
In May 1739 he planned to keep the fall schedule writing to Maurepas, "I propose to depart from New Orleans towards the first days of July and to arrive at the landing (to be named Fort Assumption in August) toward the last days of September." See MPA I 392. These dates are critical as you will soon discover.
Campaign Implementation
All the planning for the campaign was complete. It was time to implement the plan. Captain Jacques de Coustilhas (bio on Musing: Were the French Distracted? - first list Item 7) set out from New Orleans by flatboats September 6, 1738 with 130 men including Father Pierre Vitry, JV page DOCUMENT 31 (Vitry, a participant in the campaign, kept a journal of the Chickasaw campaign which will be referenced and noted herein as JV. Coustilhas' mission was to find a site for a depot that was not on Chickasaw territory but close to what were then two viable route alternatives involving the Yazoo River. Unfortunately, Coustilhas died in November from sickness and was replaced by Chevalier D'Orgon. The depot, Fort St. Francis, was completed March 1739, see JV 36. After Coustilhas' death Verges argued with D'Orgon over command, see MPA I 391. On May 8, 1739 Captain Etienne de Benac (for Benac biography see Musing: Were the French Distracted? Item 28) arrived with 80 Louisiana troops in two flatboats to take command of Fort St. Francis, see JV 38. On May 28, 1739 Chevalier de Noyan (Musing: Were the French Distracted? Item 25) arrived in four flatboats with 3 officers, 70 soldiers, and 20 Negroes, see JV 38. His mission was to find a landing in Chickasaw territory that possessed high ground and a good Mississippi River landing. At that landing he would construct a large fort to serve as the campaign headquarters and from which to explore the interior towards the Chickasaw, see MPA I 391. That site was selected by de Noyan August 11, 1739, and Fort Assumption was christened August 17, 1739, see JV 40.
With Fort Assumption established what was lacking was the timely arrival of the French and Canadian troops, the animals to convey men, supplies, and materiels to the Chickasaw, and most importantly a good road to the Chickasaw villages. Bienville and Salmon's letter to Maurepas dated May 12, 1739 established the definitive date for he arrival of the French troops, "I propose to depart from New Orleans towards the first days of July and to arrive at the landing (Fort Assumption) toward the last days of September where I expect to spend about two weeks unloading the boats and arranging our march…". See MPA I 392. Bienville planned to have his army before the Chickasaw villages in October.
A letter to Minister Maurepas from Bienville and Salmon dated June 9, 1739 provided an update of the French troops' arrival at The Balize (Fort and warehouses at entrance of Mississippi River). Two ships had arrived: one the end of May and the other the first week of June. See MPA I 400. The French troops had voyaged from three ports in France in different ships belonging to the King and two additional ships were contracted to convey supplies and materiel. In the correspondence above Bienville noted that one ship with more French troops was later than the rest. Further, gunpowder for the campaign had not arrived. In the letter above Bienville reminded that his campaign departure date from New Orleans was the first of July (see bold type in paragraph above), and now he did not feel the French troops would be rested and acclimated until August 15th. With a mid August departure from New Orleans the French troops could be three months in flatboats going to Fort Assumption. Meaning Bienville could not have the Army before the Chickasaw forts until December. Historically the cool, dry fall weather changes in North Mississippi the middle of November when the weather turns cold and wet. North America also was experiencing the Little Ice Age in the 1700s. It would have been colder than present. Bienville's campaign plan was unraveling.
The last French troops landed at The Balize June 4, 1739, and many were very sick. A number of them died in New Orleans. Major Henry de Louboey,(Musing: Were the French Distracted? Item 5) the Commandant of New Orleans, in October 1739 wrote Minister Maurepas that one hundred and fifty of the French troops had died and thirty-one were still in hospital for which he had little hope, MPA I 407. Despite the sickness, the French troops, Noailles, and Bienville finally left New Orleans beginning in early September with the last flatboat carrying Bienville casting off September 12, 1739. See MPA I 404. Bienville was two months late leaving New Orleans. One of the French lieutenants (not named) who commanded a flatboat and traveled with Noailles' convoy kept a diary ("Journal of the Chickasa War" which begins on book page 64), references to the Journal will be noted JLt. The diary is very revealing not only about the hardships of the flatboat trip up the Mississippi River but the details of the campaign. Note the journal recorded sick and dead French troops left at forts while the convoy of flatboats ascended the Mississippi River. Longueuil arrived at Fort Assumption October 11th and Celoron a week later JLt 70. Noailles' convoy of French troops reached Fort Assumption November 10 and 11, 1739, JLt 73. Bienville arrived November 14th, JLt 73. Buissonniere, the Commandant at the Illinois, arrived November 24th and 25th with 40 soldiers and 117 Indian peoples, JLt 73. All told, the Army at Fort Assumption totaled twelve hundred French, Canadian and Louisiana troops, settlers, cadets, backwoodsmen and twenty four hundred Indian peoples and Negro slaves. Camp conditions had to have been a crammed, smelly, smoky mess.
Remember Bienville wanted all the forces at Fort Assumption "towards the last days of September." Bienville arrived six weeks late. Rains had already been an issue, and the weather turned colder. The French brought their illness with them, and it would spread throughout the Army: white, black, and red. It turned out that many unwittingly came to Fort Assumption to die. The remainder of artillery, materiel, and supplies were moved by Captain de Benac from Fort St. Francis to Fort Assumption by December 7, 1739, see MPA I 410. What remained to be moved from Fort St. Francis to Fort Assumption were the oxen and horses.
Oxen and horses were driven in two groups to Fort St. Francis (Near Helena, Arkansas): one group was driven from the Illinois at least 320 miles following the west bank of the Mississippi River; the other group was driven from Natchitoches (Louisiana) at least 400 miles following the Red and Mississippi Rivers. In a campaign summary correspondence written after February 1740 Bienville wrote that 77 yoke (154) of oxen and 80 horses were driven from the Illinois and were to be delivered at Fort St. Francis by September 1739. Instead they arrived two and a half months earlier on July 15th , see JV 39, with the loss of 8 yoke of oxen and 30 horses. Likewise, 100 oxen and 230 horses were driven from the Fort at Natchitoches. None of these animals reached Fort St. Francis. There were further loses of the herd at Fort St. Francis due to lack of adequate fodder and the ensuing drive to Fort Assumption. Still more wasted away at Fort Assumption from starvation and winter weather stress. By February 1740 only 35 yoke of oxen and 30 horses were fit to support the campaign, see MPA I 429. In short, there were not enough oxen to conduct a reduced force of 800 troops, 175 Negroes and 100 officers with the food, supplies, and materiels from Fort Assumption to the Chickasaw even by taking two trips. Remember that Fort St. Francis' location was selected due to Bienville's misguided thinking that a miracle short road led east from a landing on the Mississippi River some 60 miles south of Fort Assumption to the Chickasaw. What's that got to do with the oxen and horses? If Fort St. Francis had not been built and Fort Assumption were selected as depot and Fort in Bienville's original plan, the oxen and horses from the Illinois would not have had to pass Fort Assumption going to Fort St. Francis and return later. But there were other issues concerning the oxen and horses. There were no prairies of natural grasses to feed them at Fort Assumption. The only way to save the oxen and horses at Fort Assumption was to convoy corn to them by flatboat from the Illinois.
In his letter of December 8, 1739 Bienville from Fort Assumption wrote Louboey that he planned to go to the Chickasaw via the upper Yazoo River. See MPA I 410. He did not mention searching for Pierre D'Artaguiette's 1736 route to the Chickasaw or the lack of finding it. There were plenty of French and Indians in the field searching for the best route to the Chickasaw or "good road" as Bienville termed it in a correspondence to Beauchamp. Several Indian peoples had been to the Chickasaw villages and returned to Fort Assumption. But they weren't looking for a road that could support oxen and artillery; they were looking for a kill or better a captive to torture. They had taken Natchez and Chickasaw peoples prisoner and killed several of each as well. Why hadn't a good road been found? Chevalier de Noyan had a hundreds of French men at his command. Since August 17, 1739 what had he and they been doing?
Idle camping away from their homeland was not the strong suit of the French allied Indian peoples. It was the time of the annual hunt. They complained to Bienville about the lack of activity of the army. They started leaving Fort Assumption. The first to leave were seventeen Missouri peoples on December 20, 1739, see JLt 77. Next a group of 100 left on December 23rd, see JLt 77. Bienville, realizing the lack of oxen ordered most of the artillery lowered to the base of the bluff next to the Mississippi River on December 26, 1739. See JLt 77. But on December 31st Broutin and Celoron left Fort Assumption with 100 men to find the good road to the Chickasaw, see JLt 78. Coincidently, on January 1, 1740 a captured Chickasaw told the French that the road to the Chickasaw was further north, see JLt 79. On January 11, 1740 Broutin and Celoron returned with news the good road had been found, and it was further north than they had looked before. See JLt 80. Bienville wrote Louboey January 21, 1740 that the good road to the Chickasaw was found. See MPA I 434. Did Broutin and Celoron hear what the captured Chickasaw had said about the road being further north? Or was its discovery a coincidence?
Campaign Resupply
With thousands of mouths to feed every day meant food and drink resupplies were needed. The resupply began with the Coustilhas party who were constructing Fort St. Francis: on "January 25, 1739 two boatloads of salted meat arrived from the Arkansas" (Post) (JV 37); during April, May, June and July (1739) more than 40 boats arrived with "12,000 to 15,000 pounds of provisions for the sustenance of the army" (JV 37). The resupply continued at Fort Assumption. In a letter dated December 8, 1739 Bienville confided to Louboey that he knew the situation of the campaign and the appetite of his army, "We shall not be back in the city (New Orleans) until the end of March or in April. We are far from having provisions for that time." See MPA I 411. Further in the letter he asked Louboey for two flatboats of wine and brandy. Additional resupply was addressed: on December 27, 1739 a boat and two pirogues arrived loaded with flour from the Illinois (JLt 78); on January 10, 1740 "a boat arrived from Illinois with 12,000 pounds of flour as well as other necessities of life" (JLt 80); on January 31, 1740 three pirogues coming from Ouabache (Ohio River) arrived with 17,000 pounds of salt meats (JLt 82); and on February 6, 1740 a boat from Arkansas (Post) arrived with 8,000 pounds of salt meats and 3,000 pounds of tallow (JLt 83). There were other resupply boats from Illinois, particularly delivering wheat flour and corn.
Perhaps to celebrate the finding of the good road and to demonstrate to the Indians the vibrancy of the French, on January 12th Bienville ordered a fireworks display. Two bombs from a six-inch mortar and two bombs from a nine-inch mortar were shot over the Mississippi river. The journalist recorded that the Choctaw enjoyed the demonstration, see JLt 80. On the 14th Iroquois and Canadians returned after delivering to the Chickasaw a letter from Bienville, the contents of which was not circulated at Fort Assumption, see JLt 80. Perhaps Bienville extended an offer for peace? Work crews and guards were sent to widen the path (good road) found to a road suitable for the army on January 16th, see JLt. 80. On January 18th 3 flatboats with 50 sick men left for New Orleans, see JLt 80. On January 19th two flatboats were sent to Illinois for flour, see JLt 81.
It appeared that war loomed. On February 2, 1740 a contingent of Canadians and Indian peoples set out for the Chickasaw villages, see JLt 82. On February 6th Celoron left Fort Assumption to join and lead this force, see JLt 83. Celoron's force numbered 200 Canadians and 300 Indian peoples. The force was joined by 60 Choctaw. On February 9, 1740 Celoron sent Canadians to Fort Assumption to ask for munitions of war and a small mortar and bombs. Celoron intended to "Strike a blow" against the Chickasaw was how the French described his plan. The small mortar and bombs were refused.
Also on February 9th Bienville assembled a Council of War. See JLt 83. The issue proposed was to abandon the campaign as there were not enough oxen or horses to transport a reduced force to a new depot which would be built closer to the Chickasaw. Apparently there were arguments among the Council members. On February 15, 1740 the Council of War met again and reviewed a statement prepared by Bienville and the calculations prepared by Broutin demonstrating that a reduced force could not reach the Chickasaw in two trips and in two months without compromising the King's arms. The statement's blame for the Council of War's declaration and the circumstances of the Army was "unforeseen accidents." See MPA I 429-30. All of the Council of War members signed the document, see MPA I 428-431. Flatboats began leaving Fort Assumption in bunches. Eight flatboats left on the 15th, seven more flatboats left on February 18th, , see JLt 84 . Apparently, the French gave up. The declaration of Council of War did not mention a peace with the Chickasaw! What about Celoron's force? Did it reach the Chickasaw?
On March 20, 1740 Celoron returned to Fort Assumption with his force largely intact and a prospect of peace with the Chickasaw. Three Chickasaw chiefs and three English traders accompanied him, see JLt 84. A second meeting with more Chickasaw chiefs occurred later at Fort Assumption. The Chickasaw surrendered five Natchez who had lived among them and their French captives. They assured peace with the French. Perhaps the Council of War declaration was premature? The Choctaw were not a party to the peace as their former peace had been broken by the Chickasaw. Bienville reached New Orleans on April 9, 1740 effectively ending the campaign. He had not accomplished the destruction of the Chickasaw Indians as the King had demanded.
Chickasaw Strategy
During the route surveying performed by Broutin, Verges, and Saucier there were no reported confrontations with the Chickasaw even though most of this work was performed on their territory. The same can be said of the construction of and warehousing of Fort St. Francis which was a few miles across the Mississippi River from the Chickasaw/Choctaw territory border. However, once the French landed at and started construction of Fort Assumption, Chickasaw contact began. Examples include: on August 18, 1739 two French officers in a pirogue were fired upon from the Arkansas side of the Mississippi River (JV 40) and on August 27, 1739 just after Fort Assumption was christened, a Chickasaw war club was found in a workshop of the fort (JV 40).
Thereafter, the Chickasaw left items suggesting peace. Father Vitry described the most surprising and frank evidence on October 13, 1739, "on the 13th were found in two different places two letters from the Chickasaws, both written by Frenchmen who were taken prisoners at the beginning of the summer. The first is addressed to M. de Noyan, the second to M. de Bienville. Our enemies offer to return the French prisoners and ask for peace. With these letters were significant symbols, such as a wooden club with its top broken and white feathers; these are symbols of peace." See JV 42. And again Vitry wrote, "Further tokens were discovered on the 28th (October): a leaf of corn, some tobacco, a piece of bearskin, and some medicine. By these, the Chickasaw are asking that the French eat the same bread with them, smoke the same pipe, sit on the same mat;" See JV 43.
The Chickasaw could have attacked Fort Assumption at their pleasure. They would have done so under the cloak of night. Descriptions of the fort and surrounds indicate the French and Canadian troops, settlers, backwoodsmen, and their Indian allies were arrayed on the grounds just outside the fort. There were plenty of human targets, but the Chickasaw, if they desired peace, would have selected non-human targets. A night attack that killed part or all of the oxen and/or horses would have ruined the campaign. The same can be said of a night attack that destroyed part or all of the flatboats and/or pirogues. What would help sell either would be a feint, a distracting report of guns towards the front of the fort. It would have been interesting to see how the French reacted.
A Look at the Campaign Issues
What Went Wrong?
Bienville's Unforeseen Accidents:
- The tardiness of the French troops arriving in New Orleans. The King stated they would arrive in March 1739. See MPA I 385. They arrived in early to mid June. The blame for their tardiness resided in France.
- The French troops arrived with sickness. Many of the French troops were sick when they arrived in New Orleans from France. Many died in New Orleans and throughout the campaign. The sickness was also noted at Illinois and probably spread there by those conveying foods to the Army at Fort Assumption and Fort St. Francis. The sickness was no stranger to all races at Fort Assumption. The sickness was an act of God.
- Bienville's late departure from New Orleans made weather an issue for man and beast. He knew that he had to be at the landing (what was then to become Fort Assumption) towards the last days of September in time to reach the Chickasaw before the weather changed. As regards the weather of November and December, 1739 Father Vitry noted in his diary, "The beginning of November was rainy, the month of December even more so," (JV 48). Another Father Vitry entry spoke to the winter experienced in 1739-40 at Fort Assumption, "In most countries winter is not a favorable season for waging war; but here the winter is entirely unfavorable," (JV 49). It's hard to stay warm in a tent. For the animals they were fenced in a ravine with nothing to eat. And they were outdoors in the cold and wet. Normally weather is an act of God. In this case Bienville and perhaps Noialles are to blame for the weather. Both were late leaving New Orleans.
What Really Went Wrong?
- There were too many French and Canadian troops. The King added too many troops. There were too many Indian peoples as well. As a consequence, more supplies and food were required; all of which had to be conveyed to Fort Assumption. Add to that more troops meant more oxen and horses were required to transport their supplies, materiels, and food to the Chickasaw villages. The fault for too many French, Canadian troops, and Indian peoples resided in France.
- There was too much artillery. With 8-10 Chickasaw forts to target the French would have attacked one at a time. The forts were reportedly small (less than 100 feet x 100 feet) in area. The Louisiana French discovered that cannons had proved ineffective against similarly constructed Natchez forts in 1730. The two six-inch mortars, smaller mortars, and hand mortars to throw grenades would have proved more that adequate against the Chickasaw forts. Recall in the Musing: 18th Century Mortar, the mortar bombs had fuses which were set to explode the bomb over the fort walls into hundreds of iron fragments. Likewise, the 4 ½ inch small mortar in the video had a nine pound bomb. The six-inch mortars had 20 pound bombs. Either would have proven lethal against those seeking shelter in the Chickasaw forts. Too much artillery was France's fault. They neglected to consider the country, the weather, the lack of roads, the means of conveyance for the artillery, and the size of the artillery targets.
What Really, Really Went Wrong?
- Bienville was late leaving New Orleans for Fort Assumption. He admitted to Maurepas that he wanted to be at the landing (Fort Assumption) towards the last days of September. He blamed his tardiness on the sick French troops. But that excuse was hollow as the French troops were sick when the reached New Orleans and when they left New Orleans in September enroute to Fort Assumption. Instead of blaming sickness, maybe something else distracted Bienville?
Bear with me a few sentences. The French Lieutenant recorded in his journal, "On the 28th (of January 1740) a Canadian having ill-used a negro belonging to an officer of the colony. . . See JLt 82. It is intriguing that the diarist knew that officers of Louisiana owned slaves. Compare the first and second lists in Musing: Were the French Distracted? The lists demonstrate that a number of the officers involved in the Chickasaw Wars also owned Negro slave and plantation. Three weeks later as the French were leaving Fort Assumption, the French Lieutenant noted, "On the 19th (February 1740), … We have now dispatched, by various conveyances, nearly forty sick soldiers, besides a large number of officers and soldiers of the colony, as well as all the negroes of the settlers, nearly two hundred in number, keeping about thirty only, who belong to the king." See JLt 84. Clearly, the diarist knew that 200 Negro slaves belonged to settlers, and he knew that there was a distinction between those Negroes belonging to settlers and those of the King. How did 200 settlers' owned Negro slaves find themselves involved in the Chickasaw War? An order issued by Bienville and Salmon stated that each planter will furnish a black slave who is to serve when needed in the time of war. See Superior Council of Louisiana Black Book BB 41 document dated October 10, 1739. The order caused forced slavery on the slave and a major inconvenience to the planter. In summary, a settler/planter had to furnish one Negro slave when needed and apparently as long as needed. You have to imagine that Bienville had the best of the Negroes selected from each planter. Meaning there were 200 settlers/plantation owners in Bienville' ear wanting their Negro slaves returned for the ploughing and planting season. The owners' voices broadcast loud as the plantation system at that time represented the economic engine of New Orleans. That explains why the settlers' Negroes left Fort Assumption before the King's Negroes. It could also be the reason Bienville was late leaving New Orleans. Bienville knuckled under to the pressure of the 200 Negro slave owners so that the Negroes could finish the harvesting season before leaving New Orleans. Another example of a slave serving the Chickasaw War is given in BB 35 September 5, 1738. Note in this case a Negro man and woman owned by the wheel-right for the campaign were to join him. Louisiana did not pay the Negro man a monthly salary, but the Negro woman was paid. Bienville was distracted. Ironically, Bienville and Noailles became the victims of Bienville's and Salmon's order. - The good road to the Chickasaw was not discovered before the last days of September when all of the troops were to have rendezvoused at Fort Assumption. When Bienville realized he would arrive later at Fort Assumption, he sent a pirogue to delay the Canadians and Buissonniere, the Commandant at Illinois, arrival at Fort Assumption. Chevalier de Noyan was responsible for finding the good road to the Chickasaw. When he arrived at Fort St. Francis on May 28, 1739, JV 38, he had little success motivating the Arkansas peoples to assist the survey parties searching for the good road. In fact, it was July 17, 1739 before they assisted Saucier's survey of the upper Yazoo River, JV 39. Chevalier de Noyan arrived at the landing (Fort Assumption) August 11, 1739 and with hundreds of Colonial troops and Negro slaves constructed Fort Assumption, which was christened August 17, 1739. We know that there were expeditions to find the good road. Bottom line, Broutin and Celoron reported on January 11, 1740 that a good road to the Chickasaw was found. The discovery of the good road was at least 3 months late. Did Chevalier de Noyan interrogate all of the Natchez and Chickasaw captives before they were tortured and/or killed? Were the French Indian allies requested to bring back prisoners from their expeditions in the Chickasaw homeland? The Chickasaw prisoners certainly would have known the route to the Chickasaw villages. Why was Chevalier de Noyan trusted with such a task? Certainly one of Bienville's leading officers, Jean Jadart de Beauchamp (Musing: Were the French Distracted? Item 4), the Commandant of Mobile and Chevalier de St. Louis, placed the failure of the entire expedition on de Noyan's shoulders, see MPA I 435. In all likelihood, the good road was the same that Pierre D'Artaguiette had taken in 1736 while leading the Northern Force to the Chickasaw. D'Artaguiette did not mention major rivers or flooded road, and the retreat of D'Artaguiette's force to the Mississippi River took four to five days about the same time as Broutin's and Celoron's return to Fort Assumption from the Chickasaw villages. The failure to find the good road before the end of September was inexcusable. Remember, Chevalier de Noyan was Bienville's nephew. The fault was Bienville's. He selected de Noyan and believed the Arkansas peoples knew a magic road existed in the upper Yazoo. Neither Bienville nor de Noyan both lacked the wherewithal to think to look for Pierre D'Artaguiette's road first as opposed to chasing what Bienville was told.
- The oxen and horses were driven too far and too soon. On May 4, 1740 Salmon wrote Maurepas the lack of animals (oxen and horses) was due to the fact that animals were driven too early from the Illinois, and they had to travel too far. They were driven in July on the west side of the Mississippi River to Fort St. Francis, passing by the future Fort Assumption location. In December they were driven back to Fort Assumption. See MPA I 442. The point being, if they were driven to arrive at Fort Assumption from Fort Chartres before the middle of September, they would have saved traveling at least 120 miles and the weather would have been drier and cooler. More animals would have survived had they been fed corn from Illinois. Perhaps Bienville could have salvaged the campaign? This represents poor planning on Bienville's behalf.
- In the summer of 1736 Bienville should have assembled a Council of War at Mobile to help him plan the campaign. The council should have included his best officers namely Beauchamp, Louboey, de Lery, le Sueur, Coustilhas, and Diron D'Artaguiette. For their military biographies see Musing: Were the French Distracted? Bienville should have recognized his faults. He was no military planner.
- The wrong route was taken. On March 20, 1740 Beauchamp wrote Maurepas that de Noyan selected the route (Fort Assumption), and that the route had unknown roads. He added that the route should have been by the Tombigbee River, and every officer in the colony knew that. See MPA I 435. But Beauchamp wasn't through with his assertion. A week later Beauchamp told Maurepas that the Choctaw were surprised by de Noyan's route while the Tombigbee River was so well known. See MPA I 440. Chevalier de Noyan did select the route and obviously the roads were not known. The Tombigbee River route has two fatal flaws. First, travel for the Canadians to Mobile and back to Canada from the Chickasaw would be excessive.
And second, how would the army been resupplied from Illinois? Had the Tombigbee River route been selected early in the planning process, perhaps the campaign manpower and artillery could have been reduced? When Beauchamp wrote these correspondences, the total expenditures for the campaign were not booked. Apparently the Chickasaw war which started with the explorations of survey parties in 1737 cost three times the normal annual expenditures of Louisiana. In short, the King could not afford another fiasco like Bienville's campaign. In the next twenty years the French would not attempt such a massive effort against the Chickasaw.
Could the campaign have been conducted cheaper with less troops? Less artillery? Less time? Beauchamp was spot on about the Tombigbee River. Tombigbee River route offered superlative attributes . . .
Number 1: Fort Tombecbe could be used as a depot; therefore a new depot would not have to be constructed.
Number 2: The roads (paths) from Mobile to Fort Tombecbe and on to the Chickasaw were well known and well worn by the Choctaw and Chickasaw.
Number 3: The path from Fort Tombecbe to the Chickasaw was near grass prairies all along its route, so the horses and oxen, if needed, had plenty of fodder.
Number 4: By November 1737 the Chickasaw had abandoned six forts: at Chatelaw (two) and the small prairie (four) that could house and protect the Louisiana troops and their animals.
What If after de Lery's two successful raids to cut the grain of the Chickasaws in October and November 1737, MPA III 700 and 702, Bienville had asked Lieutenant (half pay) Joseph Chauvin de Lery to lead a larger raid against the Chickasaw? In addition to a raid to cut the grain of the Chickasaw, de Lery would lead a few Louisiana troops and a few hundred Choctaws to capture or kill the Chickasaw horses and to bomb each of the Chickasaw forts in the large prairie. On his second raid in 1737 de Lery found that he had time to inspect the Chickasaw forts of the small prairie (that Bienville had attacked in May 1736). De Lery found the four forts had been abandoned and partially burned. The Chickasaw of the small prairie had moved to the large prairie. Those at Chatelaw had moved to the large prairie in 1734/5.See Paper 1 Figures 7 and 9. All of the Chickasaw and their active forts were in the large prairie. See Paper 1 Figure 10.
The path that de Lery took from the Choctaw to the Chickasaw was well known and clearly delineated on the Broutin map. To find the path on the Broutin map, look at the upper right side map legend labeled "NOTA" and look at the lower left corner and locate "FORT TOMBECBE". Go west (left) to find the Choctaw village "AbeKa". Go west a little more and note the path of reddish brown dots meandering north, up the page. Trace the dots to the "VILLAGES TCHKACHAS" or Chickasaw villages. Note the path twists and turns as it courses along the western edge of the Tombigbee River drainage area. Why so far to the west? Why wasn't the path closer to the Tombigbee River? A path user would not have large water bodies to cross; he could travel quickly. The area between the path and the Tombigbee River lies in the Selma Chalk geophysical belt. It runs in a 300 mile arc from central Alabama to Northeastern Mississippi. It includes Fort Tombecbe and the Chickasaw villages. The Selma Chalk is a several hundred foot thick geologic unit that expresses itself on the surface as alkaline soils. The alkaline soils tend to favor post and live oaks as opposed to red and white oaks. Eastern red cedars and grasses proliferate. Throughout the Selma Chalk there are/were numerous prairies that abounded in game. The prairie grasses could have fed horses and oxen most of the year.
What If Bienville had sent de Lery back to attack the Chickasaw forts with a force of hundreds of Choctaw, a hundred or less Louisian troops, a few hundred grenades and a dozen or so hand mortars to throw them (see Musing: 18th Century Hand Mortar)?
What If he also had three or four small mortars and bombs. To minimize weight and maintain effectiveness I would use 4 ½ inch mortars with 9 pound bombs (see Musing: 18th Century Mortar).
Maybe Bienville wouldn't have to tell Maurepas about the raid until it was over. The small mortars, bombs and grenades were already in Louisiana. In 1732 an inventory was made of the Colony by the King including munitions, see MPA III 564. In the Colony there were over 1200 grenades and a dozen small mortars. What's more Fort Maurepas staffed a half company (15) Karrer Swiss Grenadiers! They would have experience firing the small mortars and hand mortars. The force of Louisiana troops could have marched from Mobile to Fort Tombecbe which could have been used as a depot. Supplies, flour, powder, mortars and bombs etc could have been flat boated from Mobile to Fort Tombecbe.
How large a Louisiana force would be needed? On both of de Lery's visits to the Chickasaw villages in October - November 1737 the Chickasaw warriors had rushed his positions en masse. De Lery had anticipated their maneuver and prepared trenches. On both occasions the Chickasaw were repelled with loses. On his raids de Lery did not have small mortars or hand mortars. The hand mortars and grenades could fire quickly and could help break up large Chickasaw offensive threats. When would the force go? They would leave Mobile the middle of August 1738 when the corn of the Chickasaw was full. The campaign would take less than ten weeks round trip to and from Mobile. The Louisiana troops would be in the Chickasaw village area less than two weeks.
Bienville's Revenge?
Chickasaw 3: Bienville 0. Bienville was replaced as Governor of Louisiana in1743. He had a pension, and he had accumulated many slaves and properties, see Musing: Were the French Distracted? Bienville retired to Paris. He lived to an advanced age. Perhaps in his dreams and his thoughts, when the embers of his fireplace took him captive, he contemplated his loses.
References:
1. MPA Mississippi Provincial Archives French Dominion (Volumes I, II and III). Volume I available HathiTrust Digital Library. Volumes II and III are available from same site if one clicks previous screen.
2. JV Forgotten Books Mid America Volume 28 January 1946 Number 1 The Journal of Pierre Vitry, S.J. Jean Delanglez page 30.
f:/Users/SteveC/Downloads/MidAmerica1946_10874286.pdf
3. JLt Mississippi As a Province, Territory, and State J.F.H. Claiborne 1880 Power and Barksdale Publishers, Jackson Miss. Journal of the Chickasa War page 64. https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735054852607/viewer#page/92/mode/2up
4. BB Black Books of the Superior Council of Louisiana. Louisiana State Museum Collections. Colonial Documents Black Books Reference Page
I trust you enjoyed my musings, especially the Chickasaw readers. A fine history you have, an indomitable spirit you possess.
Regards from Tupelo,
Steve Cook
July 16, 2022